Jukka Juutilainen

Saksan ilmavoimien ylipäällikön kaukotiedustelijat

3 viestiä aiheessa

Taustalta kuuluu Fullerin Lontoon Portterin vaimea sihahdus...Jumojen ääni alkaa kantautumaan jälleen taas korviin. Saksalaiset lentotiedustelijat eivät jätä rauhaan  ;D.


Alkupalaksi alustus Aufklärungsgruppe des.Ob.d.L.stä:




Muutamia poimintoja Oberst Theodor Rowehlin muisteloista:


1. "In 1934 the first photo-flights over the Soviet Union began. Initially these covered the Finnish Bight, Kronstadt and Leningrad, then in the direction of Pleskau-Minsk? and eventually the Black Sea coast with Nikolayev as the target"


2. "Operations from Finland

18-20 Jun 1941 - Three He 111P transports flew the components for a radio station into Luonetjärvi airfield.[5]


20 Jun 1941 - Two Do 215B and one He 111 flew into Luonetjärvi, located in central Finland. This Kette (or Kdo.) of 1. (F)/Ob.d.L. was commanded by Hptmn Bolle.[5]


21 Jun 1941 - additional personnel were flown into the airfield.[5]


22 Jun 1941 - 20 Aug 1941 - the Kette flew numerous sorties from Luonetjärvi covering the Leningrad to Murmansk railway and 'Stalin's' Canal in East Karelia.[5]


13 Sep 1941 - By this time the Kette, and their associated equipment, had left Luonetjärvi.[5] "


3. "Fighters

Types: Rata, MiG, Yak The Rata posed no danger to a Ju 88 unless the crew was taken by surprise. MiGs? and Yaks were better without question. The basic defence was try to keep about 1,000 metres above the enemy fighter by light use of the throttle and minimal height loss to gain speed and try to find cloud cover. If it was not possible to avoid combat, opening fire at about 600 metres often caused the enemy to turn away. The keenness of the Soviet fighters was very variable, single fighters especially could be turned away by defensive fire. If the fighter could not be shaken off quickly, depending upon the experience of the crew, the best defence was to descend to low level. The greatest drawback for fighters is to get involved in a turning battle.



Heavy flak was not generally a worry except for the heavily defended targets (Reval, Bologoje and Leningrad) where it was very bad, otherwise it could be ignored when the method previously described when over the target could be used. Naturally there were only a few experiences with light and medium flak as the flights were normally out of range. In the whole time noted not a single loss by the staffel due to heavy flak is known. The Soviet flak did not have radio or radar warning systems.


[edit]Weather problems

In the northern sector during the time discussed high pressure weather prevailed. This led to the formation of contrails which were avoided by changes in altitude and propeller pitch.


[edit]Mission reporting

After landing the crew telephoned reports to the Luftflotte HQ. Important details were reported to the Ic in person. Final results of the mission were only known after examination of the photos obtained. Especially important pictures (targets, bridges, the condition of riverbanks etc) after printing, with the negatives, were taken by courier aircraft to the Ic of the Luftflotte".


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1. viestissä mainittu wiki-viite on tyhjä - mitä pitäisi olla? Mikä on muuten viite [5] Rowehlin muistelmissa; missä ne on julkaistu? - Rowehl kävi muuten Suomessa keväällä 1939, ja on ilmeisesti silloin tavannut kapteeni Eskolan (ks. artikkelini Eskolan salaisista kuvauslennoista ennen talvisotaa, Sotahistoriallisessa aikakauskirjassa no 25 (2006),



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